Washington’s latest round of measures against Tehran, marketed internally as an ‘economic D-Day’, faces a fundamental problem with Iran trade sanctions impact: the countries doing the most business with Iran are either unwilling or unable to stop. From China and Turkey to Pakistan and Armenia, a network of trading relationships has built up over decades that US pressure alone may struggle to unravel.
Iran has lived under near-continuous American economic pressure since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Over that period, it has forged trade ties with nations that have their own reasons to keep commerce flowing regardless of what Washington says.
China: the dominant buyer the sanctions must reach
No country is more central to the Iran trade sanctions impact debate than China. According to data from the International Trade Centre (ITC), a subsidiary of the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation, China accounted for 26.9% of Iran’s exports in 2025. The official figures, however, substantially understate the real picture.
According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China reported $9.96 billion in total bilateral trade with Iran in 2025. But that figure excludes roughly $31.2 billion in unreported Iranian crude oil exports to China, which, if included, would comprise over 75% of total bilateral trade between the two countries.
The oil dimension is substantial. Data from China Data Portal shows China imported 900,000 barrels per day of Iranian crude in 2025, representing 7% of China’s total oil imports. According to analytics firm Kpler, cited by Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide, China buys more than 80% of all Iranian oil shipped. There is also a physical stockpile: United Against Nuclear Iran reports that 25 million barrels of Iranian crude worth over $2 billion had been stored in China since before 2019, giving Beijing a cushion even if flows were interrupted.
China’s response to the US announcement was immediate. It said it was firmly opposed to what it called ‘illegal unilateral sanctions’, that economic pressure tactics would not help resolve problems, and that Beijing would safeguard its own interests. The ITC data itself comes with caveats: economists believe a significant portion of Iranian oil sales to China were underreported for political reasons even before the current conflict, and import data from some of Iran’s other trading partners, such as Iraq, is incomplete.
Turkey, Pakistan and Armenia: neighbours with complicated loyalties
Turkey is another large trading partner of Iran, according to ITC data, but its position is more fraught than China’s. As the only Nato member to share a border with Iran, Turkey must balance its relationships with military allies against the realities of geography and commerce. Its economy is already under strain, with inflation running at 31.8% according to official data, and economists argue it could not simply halt trade with its neighbour without serious damage.
Pakistan faces a similarly conflicted position. It is one of Iran’s biggest export partners, according to ITC data, yet its own largest export market is the United States, giving Washington considerably more leverage over Islamabad than over Ankara. Pakistan is also serving as a mediator in peace talks between the US and Iran, meaning any deterioration in its relationship with either side would complicate diplomacy as well as commerce.
The situation is made more tangled by oil smuggling across the 900km Iran-Pakistan border. The BBC has seen evidence of fuel being moved across that border en masse by bikers, some as young as 15, a practice the Pakistani government has struggled to police in remote areas despite pressure from the US and Pakistan’s own oil firms. The BBC previously asked the Iranian government to comment on its alleged involvement in the smuggling; it did not respond.
Armenia rounds out the picture. Another major trading partner of Iran, according to the ITC, it is notable for the fact that its top export partner is Russia, which accounts for 34.9% of all goods Armenia sold in 2025, despite Russia having faced sanctions from the US and its allies since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. That history suggests Armenia is unlikely to sever ties with Iran simply because Washington calls for it.
Why economists are sceptical the squeeze will hold
The US said the sanctions would ‘tighten the noose and block every potential source of revenue’, in the words of Bessent. But the reaction from analysts has been far from alarmed. Advisory firm Oxford Economics described the direct impact on Iran’s revenues as ‘somewhat of a damp squib’.
Ali Vaez, deputy director at the International Crisis Group, put the challenge plainly: ‘Anything that moves in Iran has already been sanctioned by multiple layers of sanctions, in fact. So the question now is one of enforcement. Does the United States have what it takes to impose fines and levies on countries that continue to trade with Iran?’ He also pointed to the US starting an economic confrontation with China, Iran’s biggest trading partner, and then, in his words, ‘backed out of it’.
Former senior advisor at the state department Aya Ibrahim argued that Washington’s overreliance on sanctions ‘incentivises countries to find ways around that system’. She also raised concerns that the measures may hit ordinary people hardest, as they ‘deny people necessities to stay alive’.
Global markets have so far given the announcement little weight. Oil prices fell after the news but remain well above pre-war levels, and the major stock indexes across the US, Europe and Asia barely moved. Until the US demonstrates a willingness to pursue enforcement against large economies such as China and Turkey, the network of trade keeping Iran’s revenues flowing looks unlikely to fracture.
